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As computing devices become ubiquitous, devices are expected to 
encounter and associate with one another spontaneously to form 
ad hoc networks for sharing resources. One of the challenges in 
research remains in the task of making a device association 
scheme secure and, at the same time, easy to use. There have been 
numerous proposed solutions from literatures, with each solution 
designed for specific purposes and scenarios. At present, there is 
no clarity of differences and similarities amongst those association 
methods. In this paper, we present a classification of device 
association methods based on categories that influence the 
usability of an association. 
Categories and Subject Descriptors 
D.4.6 [Operating Systems]: Security and Protection – 
Authentication; H.1.2 [Information Systems]: User/Machine 
Systems – Human factors. 
General Terms 
Security, Human Factors. 
Keywords 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Short-range wireless communication is becoming popular in 
electronic devices; the communication capability has made many 
new services possible. For example, standards like Bluetooth, Wi-
Fi, etc. have enabled devices to form ad hoc networks to share 
resources and information. Nevertheless, before devices can 
exchange data, they need to execute an association process for 
introducing and forming a connection amongst themselves with 
one another. The process involves the new connecting device(s) 
finding the targets to establish a communication channel. 
However, unprotected communications are vulnerable to 
interception; due to the inherent open broadcast nature of wireless 
communication, wireless channels require security. To establish a 
secure connection, a common secret key must be agreed among 
the participating devices during their association. 
At present, the typical device association model1 is based on a 3-
step process: identification of neighbouring devices (e.g. 
Bluetooth discovery protocol), user selection of the target 
device(s), and authentication by a passkey (usually in alphanu-
merical form). However, this model has both usability and 
                                                                
1 Suomalainen et al. define an association model as the part of the 
association procedure that is visible to the user [33]. 
security problems. For instance, a long and random passkey can 
increase security but, simultaneously, it decreases usability; 
conversely, using a short passkey is vulnerable to passive attacks. 
As technology evolves, some devices may not even have an input 
interface that supports passkey entry; thus, in reality, it is 
impractical to mandate a single association model for all kinds of 
devices [33]. To address this concern, many alternative solutions 
have been proposed in research. Each of the proposed solutions 
targets a specific scenario with different sets of hardware, 
requirements and limitations; in other words, different association 
models have been suggested for their individual purposes. To 
further understand the overall complexity, we need an overview of 
the current situation; a general classification of device association 
models is needed. In [33], Suomalainen et al. present a systematic 
taxonomy of security protocols for key establishment; while their 
focus was on security, in this paper, we present a classification of 
spontaneous device association from a usability perspective. The 
goal of this classification is to identify categories that influence 
the usability of an association, and the categories serve to help 
designers and researchers to consider the contextual factors of an 
association. 
2. CLASSIFICATION CATEGORIES 
Our focus in this paper is oriented from a non-technical 
viewpoint; we present a classification based on usability aspects. 
We identify and define categories (and their sub-categories) for 
classifying the components of a device association. We refer 
readers to figure 1 for an overview of the classification. 
At the highest level (the root), we have Spontaneous Device 
Association. The aims of a spontaneous association are to achieve 
good usability and good security. An association method requires 
fast and intuitive interaction where users spend minimal time to 
form a device connection and simultaneously the method must 
maintain and support maximal protection to prevent harmful 
attacks; in other words, minimum effort and maximum security. 
Below the top level, we define three main criteria: Technology, 
User Interaction and Application Context. The technology cate-
gory focuses on the physical aspects of the hardware equipment 
and the communication channel. The user interaction criterion 
refers to the relations between users and hardware based on the 
users’ action. And lastly, application context refers to the circum-
stances happening during an association. In the rest of this paper, 
each criterion and it sub-levels are discussed with definitions and 
examples. 
2.1 Technology 
Any device with a network capability is ideally able to associate 
with other devices that have the same network capability. 
However, designers need to consider the physical and technical 
limitations of the devices to design a usable association. For in-
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stance, a heavy and bulky device or a device without motion 
tracking capability cannot adopt the shaking method to establish a 
connection [14,20]. To distinguish the limitations, we categorise 
two factors that influence the design of an association model: 
Device Capabilities and Trust & Authentication Establishment. 
2.1.1 Device Capabilities 
In short, the device capabilities category refers to the characteris-
tics of the physical devices. This category can further be 
subdivided into the following variables: 
Ownership: We classify three types of device ownership: 
Personal (a device that solely belongs to one person), Private 
Group (a device that is shared by a private group of users), and 
Public (a device that is accessible to anyone). A public device has 
no privacy as anyone can access it (like a public library com-
puter); conversely, a personal device is fully private thus personal 
information is stored. The ownership of the device directly affects 
users’ willingness to associate the device with other foreign 
devices. For example, users are more reluctant to connect their 
personal device to a public terminal, as the users are less certain 
about the security and trustworthiness of the public device; for 
such type of association, discreetness and robust security are 
needed. 
Required User Interface: This category refers to the hardware 
features that facilitate an interaction between users and their 
devices. The category comprises of two classes: Input and Output. 
The input attribute refers to the features that allow the users to 
manipulate a system, whereas the output attribute refers to the 
features that allow the system to indicate the effects of the users’ 
manipulation. Different devices have different input and output 
facilities. Identifying a full set of all possible hardware features is 
impossible. Instead, the purpose of this category is for identifying 
requirements of an association model. When designing an 
association, designers should consider the required input and 
output features and how they can affect the overall usability. For 
example, shaking requires a motion sensor on each device; audio 
requires devices with an audio emitter (speaker) and an audio 
receiver (microphone); and so forth. 
Mobility: Five types of device mobility are identified: Mobile, 
Portable, Situated, Wearable and Automobile.  For simplicity, we 
use examples to illustrate the five categories. A cellular phone is 
mobile, as it is light-weighted and easy to carry. A laptop 
computer is portable, as a user can carry it while moving, but the 
bulkiness limits its mobility. A cinematic projector is situated, as 
the device is anchored in a fixed location. However, wearable 
devices do not fit into any of those three categories. Wearable 
devices are neither mobile nor portable, as they must be placed in 
a fixed location of the wearer to function whilst, at the same time, 
the devices are not situated as the wearer is mobile. For example, 
the Nike+iPod Sports Kit [1] sensor is wearable as it is embedded 
inside a shoe, yet it is not mobile as it must be on a specific 
location of the wearer to capture information. Finally, a standard 
vehicle nowadays has many embedded devices; the devices are 
fixed onto the vehicle to support many functions that offered by 
the vehicle as a whole. Thus, we can view an automobile as a 
single unit device. 
Size: Another physical factor that influences the usability of an 
association model is the size of the connecting devices. Fast 
moving interaction techniques are mostly suitable for small 
devices; however, as we understand from Fitts’s Law [9], smaller 
objects are also harder to aim/target for interaction that require 
precision, like pointing a laser at a receiver to authenticate devices 
[16,22]. An association model that is suitable for one type of 
device may not be suitable for another. We therefore classify 
devices according to their dimension to recognise their differ-
ences. However, we cannot classify devices based on their exact 
measurements; instead, we use metaphors to define their different 
sizes: Candy/Pin (e.g. small microphones, body sensors), Soap 
(e.g. mobile phones, digital audio players), Book (e.g. laptops, 
tablet PCs), Furniture (e.g. desktop PC, tabletop computer), 
Notice Board (e.g. large display monitors), Wall (e.g. electronic 
billboards; similar to Notice Board but much larger in size, such 
that it cannot fit indoors) and Irregular (everything else). 
Device mobility is often seen as related to the size and the weight 
of the device, e.g. mobile devices are generally small and 
lightweight. However, this assumption is not strictly true. A 
device may be small in size but attached to a fixed location, thus it 
is not mobile, but situated instead. In other words, the two 
categories, mobility and size, are loosely related with exceptional 
cases. 
2.1.2 Trust and Authentication Establishment 
This category may refer to many aspects in security, including 
protocols and algorithms. Here, we are particularly interested in 
aspects that are related to usability; we therefore neglect anything 
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that does not involve the users. In addition, this category refers to 
the mechanisms that enable devices to authenticate communica-
tion channels and to establish trust between devices. 
Before designers select an authentication technology, they need to 
acknowledge that not all associations require security. The need of 
security depends on the application context, there are scenarios 
where security can be omitted (we discuss this in detail later). 
Authentication may be optional if the context of the application is 
risk-free. Nevertheless, in spontaneous interaction where commu-
nications happen unexpectedly, it is likely that devices encounter 
in an unpredicted location and associate in a previously untrusted 
manner; in which case, security is required. Here, we identify two 
approaches that can be used for establishing trust and 
authenticating devices during an association. 
Certification: Digital certificate can be used for establishing 
trusted and secure channels between devices. The use of 
certificates requires the associating devices to recognise an 
external mutual trusted party (a certificate authority) that signs 
their certificates. However, this is an unattractive option as it 
requires a huge infrastructure which is expensive [19]. 
Furthermore, certificates are used for verifying a binding between 
a public key and an identity in the form of a digital address. Yet, 
for device association, such binding is not sufficient, as we still 
need a binding between a public key and the target device itself 
[17]. As a result, a user is still required to validate the fingerprints 
of the public keys to ensure the keys are affiliated with the correct 
devices. Although certification is impractical for large-scale 
implementation, it is still usable in small-scale if a common 
trusted authority amongst the devices is known prior the 
association. 
Out-of-band (OOB) Channel: An alternative approach is via the 
use of a secure OOB channel. While wireless messages are 
transmitted over an insecure channel (the in-band channel), 
authentication data can be transmitted over an external channel 
(the out-of-band channel). An OOB channel is established with 
the aid of a human operator. The user initiates a device 
association by accomplishing a simple task like entering a text 
into the selected devices; as a result, the communication is 
implicitly authenticated by the task, as no adversary can forge the 
user’s action. Nonetheless, due to the involvement of a human 
user, an association model must only adopt non-laborious tasks to 
achieve good usability, and it must also be inaccessible by 
assailants to maintain high security. 
A wide range of OOB channels have been suggested from 
research. Here, we briefly identify the channels as follow: 
Physical Contact e.g. electrical contact [32] and human touch 
contact (tactile) [24]; Computer Vision e.g. using a camera to 
capture a visual code of the target device [23] or to capture 
blinking patterns [28,29]; Light Beams e.g. infrared beams [2,34] 
and laser beams [4,16,22]; Sound Waves e.g. acoustics audio 
[11,12,30] and ultrasound [17,21]; Human Actions e.g. synchro-
nous button presses [15,26,31], random motions (or shaking) 
[5,14,20], synchronous gestures [13], gestures entry [25], passkey 
entry [6,10], text comparison [6,10,18,36] and biometrics [7]; 
Distance Proximity e.g. near field communication [27]; and Radio 
Signals e.g. radio environment comparison [35] or differences in 
broadcast packets [8]. 
The selection of OOB channels is not exclusively limited to using 
only one OOB channel. Multiple OOB channels can be used 
simultaneously. For instance, the Loud & Clear [11,12] concept 
adopts both audio and human channels; it involves a user 
comparing audio vocalisations to authenticate devices. 
2.2 User Interaction 
To understand the usability of an association model, we evaluate 
the interactions that users must perform; thus, we need to consider 
factors that influence the interaction interface of an association 
model. In this section, we define and discuss the following four 
categories: User Involvement, Controllability, Perceptibility and 
Validation Method. 
2.2.1 User Involvement 
Using the categorisation of different OOB channels, we can 
further classify them based on users’ role during an association. 
Different OOB channels require different involvement of the 
users. Some channels require minimum user involvement, e.g. a 
user initiates the association and the rest of procedure executes 
automatically. We refer this type of user involvement as Device-
to-Device (D2D) (the terminology is adopted from [29]) because 
the authentication data is generated and transferred directly from 
one device to the receiving devices.  For example, the techniques 
of pointing a light beam to a photo-sensor [2,4,16,22,34] are 
D2D, since the user is only required to point the beam and the rest 
is completed by the devices. 
The second type of user involvement is a user generates and 
inputs authentication data directly into the associating devices and 
the data is used by the devices to authentication one another. We 
refer this as Human-to-Device (H2D). For example, the technique 
of shaking to associate devices [5,20] is H2D, as it requires a user 
to input the authentication data (captured from motion sensors) 
directly into all the devices. H2D requires more users’ 
involvement than D2D as H2D require the users to generate the 
authentication data. From users’ viewpoint, it is possible that H2D 
is more intuitive as the users’ involvement allows them to 
participate in the process; thus, they are more aware of the 
authentication being taking place. However, since authentication 
data is generated by a human user, the data is predictable by 
examining the user’s habit. 
The third type of user involvement is having the users as the 
middle persons to convey authentication data. This requires a 
device first generating its authentication data and presents the data 
to a human user, and then the user inputs the data into the target 
devices. We refer this as Device-to-Human-to-Device (D2H2D), 
as it requires the authentication data to flow through two 
channels: first from device-to-human (D2H) and then human-to-
device (H2D). An example of a D2H2D technique is the text 
comparison scheme [6,10,18,36]. The associating devices first 
negotiate a secure connection. After the negotiation, each of the 
devices displays a digital fingerprint (or a hash value) to its user. 
The user reads and compares the fingerprints: if they are identical, 
the user confirms and accepts the connection, else the user rejects 
it. Unfortunately, D2H2D schemes have 2 downfalls: (i) the 
representation of the authentication data is limited to a human 
interpretable form; (ii) the scheme is mentally demanding as users 
are required to examine the authentication data from every device. 
The mental demand increases as the number of devices increases. 
On the other hand, this scheme is suitable for devices with limited 
I/O capabilities, e.g. devices with a simple display and a binary 
input for accept or reject. 
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2.2.2 Controllability 
In any association models, we can classify them based on how 
users control the connecting devices. We identify two categories: 
Single User Control and Individual User Control. Single user 
control refers to techniques that limit one person from a group of 
users to control and operate the entire association. For instance, 
the technique of shaking devices [5,14,20] is controlled by a 
single user, as only one person can shake the devices at once. If 
each individual user shakes their own devices, the devices would 
have different shaking patterns. On the contrary, individual user 
control techniques allow each user to operate their devices during 
an association. 
In many cases, a user often wants to connect multiple personal 
devices e.g. connecting a mobile phone and a Bluetooth headset. 
In such a scenario, the user can operate the devices by oneself; 
thus, single user control techniques are appropriate. On the other 
hand, there are cases where a user associates his/her personal 
device to other peoples’ devices; in such a scenario, each person 
should operate their own devices; thus, individual user control 
techniques are more suitable. From a social point of view, single 
user control techniques can be deemed as inappropriate in group 
associations. For example, personal devices (like mobile phones 
and PDAs) often contain private and sensitive information such as 
emails and personal pictures; some single user control techniques 
require users to surrender their physical possession of their 
devices to the person who conducts the association. This may be 
acceptable if the group of users socially trust one another; 
however, when strangers are involved, single user control 
techniques can raise security and privacy concerns. 
Some association techniques can be classified as both single user 
and individual user; it depends how the techniques are executed. 
The text comparison techniques, for example, allow a group of 
users to select one member to perform the comparison task (single 
user) or, alternatively, all of the members can verbalize their 
authentication text message and perform the comparison task 
(individual user). 
2.2.3 Perceptibility 
Regular users do not understand the technical aspects of how an 
association is executed; instead, their understandings come from 
the action they need to perform. As a result, people interpret an 
association based on what they can gather from their sensory 
system. 
Physiologically, humans have five natural input senses. So far, 
sight, hearing and touch are commonly applied in computer 
interaction. By exploiting those senses, designers can create 
different interfaces for users to associate devices (we found no 
research that explores taste or smell for device association). 
People can use their senses to construct a mental perception of the 
physical interaction of operating an association. By constructing a 
perception, the users can estimate the execution of the association. 
We therefore define perceptibility as the way how users perceive 
the interaction of an association model. 
Every association has a two-part procedure: initiation and 
execution. The initiation must always be administered by a human 
user, as the user must interact with his/her device to start it; thus, 
the initiation stage is always perceived as interactive. The second 
stage, the execution of the association, is where we can identify 
different perceptibility. 
We classify three types of perceptibility: Tangible, Sensible (or 
Perceivable) and Non-interactive. A tangible association requires 
its users to physically touch to interact with the connecting 
devices to accomplish the execution. For example, shaking 
requires a user to physically touch the devices; thus, the action is 
tactile and tangible. Conversely, the execution of a 
sensible/perceivable association can be perceived by seeing (e.g. a 
laser beam) or hearing (e.g. acoustics audio), but the execution of 
the association does not require users to interact with the devices 
physically. Lastly, a non-interactive association executes its 
procedure without the intervention of its users. For example, 
Amigo [35] uses radio signals which cannot be touched, seen nor 
heard; hence, from a user’s viewpoint, the execution happens 
automatically. 
2.2.4 Validation Method 
Earlier, different OOB channels for device authentication were 
identified. From a user’s perspective, the use of an OOB channel 
is deemed as a tool to transmit authentication data. To understand 
its usability, we need to analyse the channel from the interaction 
perspective. Users see the interaction as a way of validating an 
association; thus, the adoption of an OOB channel is a validation 
method in users’ view. The validation methods that have so far 
been suggested in literatures can be described into three different 
approaches: Information-based, via a Physically limited channel, 
or Automatic. 
A method that requires a human to authenticate devices via a 
piece of information, such as text, is classified as information-
based validation. Two types of information-based validation were 
identified by Mayrhofer and Gellersen [20]: human verification 
based on direct output of the associating devices, or direct user 
input of authentication material into the involved devices. The 
former can be thought of as an interactive challenge-response 
protocol, with the user in the role of verifying device responses, 
while the latter as having the user in the role of providing explicit 
input into the involved devices to ensure that the intended devices 
authenticate. 
Alternatively, a physically limited channel can be used, where the 
user is in the role of physically controlling the intended devices 
over a limited channel. Three types of limited channels are 
identified: Location-limited, Movement-limited, and Time-limited. 
A location-limited channel has the property that human operators 
can precisely control which devices are communicating with one 
another within a spatially-limited area [3]; for example, infrared 
and sound as they have a limited range. Defined by Mayrhofer 
and Gellersen, a channel is movement-limited, if it affords precise 
user control over which devices can communicate, by way of 
controlling their movement and by using movement as shared 
secret [20]. And, although there is no formal definition, we 
consider a channel is time-limited if a set of actions is executed by 
a user within a precise time interval. For example, SyncTap [26] 
allows a user to establish device connections through synchronous 
button operations. 
Lastly, an authentication is automatic if it requires no user 
intervention. For example, authentication via a third party 
certificate or using radio features [35]. These methods can execute 
without the assistance of a human user. 
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2.3 Application Context 
From a security standpoint, device authentication is always 
necessary as information that travels over any wireless channel is 
susceptible and vulnerable to attacks. In contrast, from a usability 
viewpoint, in some (or many) situations, security and authentica-
tion may seem unnecessary or paranoid. Consider the following 
instance: John is at home browsing pictures on his computer, he 
finds a few interesting pictures and he wants to upload them onto 
his personal device. In this scenario, John is at home, in a safe 
haven, and based on his surrounding context, his action is risk-
free. So, is it necessary to inconvenience John for additional 
security? Some may argue that John’s neighbours could tap into 
his connection; then the question becomes, is it worth compro-
mising security for convenience. 
When designing an association model, it is important to consider 
the context of the application to decide whether security is neces-
sary. Security procedures may sometimes be annoying if users see 
no risk in the task; thus, security is best avoided if possible. To 
aid understanding the context of an application, we identify four 
categories: Duration, Cardinality, Location Privacy and Distance. 
2.3.1 Duration 
Duration refers to the period of existence of a connection. For 
short-lived connections, like sharing an image file, users may see 
security as unnecessary if the authentication procedure lasts 
longer than the connection. The duration of a connection is 
predictable based on the objective of the connection. By 
estimating the duration, designers can decide if an association is 
suitable for the objective of the connection.  
We define three types of duration: Transient, Session-based and 
Permanent. A transient connection terminates after a predefined 
condition is met and the duration expires within a certain time 
period that is calculable by examining the action. For example, 
file transfer is transient, as the connection terminates after the 
receiver has acquired the files and its duration is calculable by 
examining the size of the files and data speed of the channel. A 
session-based connection terminates after a predefined condition 
is met but the duration is not calculable. For example, network 
games and teleconferences are session-based. Their connections 
terminate once their sessions are over, yet the durations of the 
sessions are not calculable. A permanent connection ideally lasts 
indefinitely and it has no predictable terminating condition. The 
only terminating conditions are physical failure or a forced 
termination by a human operator. For example, the connections 
for wireless accessory devices like Bluetooth mice and keyboards 
are considered permanent. 
2.3.2 Cardinality 
Most proposed methods in research are based on the idea of 
associating two devices (i.e. pairing), but, in reality, we often find 
situations where more than a pair of devices are involved. For 
example, a group of gamers want to form an ad-hoc network to 
play a network game. Association models differ as the number of 
devices changes. As more devices are involved, more user 
interaction is required. Adopting an association model designed 
for the wrong cardinality may negatively impact its usability. For 
example, the model of pointing a laser for device authentication 
can only execute a pair of devices at a time; using such scheme for 
multiple devices requires many interactions, and as the number of 
interactions increases, mental demand also increases and effi-
ciency decreases. 
Three types of cardinality for device association are identified: 
Pairing, Physically Limited and Unlimited. Pairing, as the name 
suggested, is strictly limited to two devices. Physically limited 
cardinality association models have the property of allowing many 
devices to authenticate at once; however, due to some physical 
constraints, the association can only accommodate a limited 
number of devices. For example, shaking to associate devices 
[14,20] is physically limited in cardinality, as the number of 
devices a user can hold with his/her hands is limited. In such a 
case, the cardinality depends on the physical sizes of the devices 
and the user’s hands. Unlimited cardinality is theoretically not 
bounded by its physical factors. For example, passkey entry and 
text comparison have no upper limit. The number of devices does 
not create a limitation as long as the passkey or the text value can 
be acknowledged by the users. 
Directionality & Management: Pairing has a 1-to-1 device rela-
tion. Authentication of such a relationship could be either 
unidirectional or bidirectional. Unidirectional pairing achieves 
one device validating the other, not vice versa. This mainly 
depends on the implementation and the protocol. To achieve 
mutual authentication with unidirectional pairing, the user must 
repeat the authentication in the reverse direction. Conversely, 
bidirectional pairing achieves mutual authentication with one 
execution. 
As the number of devices increases to more than two, the device 
relationship differs. Depends on the application needs, different 
network topologies can be adopted. A star topology network 
requires one device to be the proxy and every other device must 
associate with the proxy; in such a case, association is centrally 
managed by the proxy device and the device relation is 1-to-N 
(where N is number of devices excluding the proxy). A network 
that employs a fully connected topology is a peer to peer network; 
management is decentralised (or distributed) and the device 
relation is N-to-N. In a fully connected ad-hoc network, every 
device needs to associate with every other device; thus, the 
number of association increases exponentially as the cardinality 
increases. Lastly, topologies like ring, line or tree require devices 
to associate only with their neighbouring devices; therefore, those 
topologies have the device relation of 1-to-n (where n is the 
number of neighbours). 
2.3.3 Location and Social Privacy 
In a house, different doors in different rooms for different 
purposes have different types of security locks. For example, a 
front door may have sophisticated locks that are difficult to break, 
while a door to the back yard may require less security as the 
backyard is protect by the fence, and some doors inside the house, 
like a kitchen door, may not even have a lock. The point is 
security requirements differ based on the location context. If an 
application is designed to be used in a risk free environment, 
authentication could be optional. For example, people save 
passwords on their personal computers (thus no authentication) 
because they know only trusted members can access the machines; 
conversely, people do not save passwords on public computers as 
the risk is high. 
Here, we categorise three privacy settings: Private (or Personal), 
Secluded Communal and Open Public. A personal private area 
can be considered as a safe zone, a place where users trust and 
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know no intruders are within the space, and, within this space, 
minimum security is required.  For example, if a user at home who 
wants to connect his mobile device to his home central system; 
the user should not need to go through a tedious authentication 
procedure. Instead, authentication should require minimum user 
effort. Next, we have environment that are confined by some 
physical features, like walls; however, not all confined spaces are 
private. Using an office space for example, the room could be 
confined by walls, yet it is not fully private as it is shared with 
other employees. We called such environment a secluded commu-
nal space. The level of threat inside a secluded communal space is 
minimal yet not risk free. A user may know who has access to this 
space but the user has no control over who is allowed to enter the 
space. Thus, the user has a certain level of awareness of knowing 
the surrounding environment but not able to control it. Finally, a 
user inside an open public space has no information about his/her 
surrounding peers. A cafe, for example, is an open public area. 
Random people can move in and out of the space; threat level 
increases, as devices in an open area are more vulnerable. 
2.3.4 Distance 
Another variable that influences the design and usability of an 
association model is the distance of interactivity. The closer the 
distance between the associating devices, the more information 
about the devices would be available to the users. For example, it 
is simpler for a user to identify a device if the device is 
immediately in front of him/her than a distance away. We 
therefore identify three categories to define the distance of 
interaction: Reachable, Noticeable and Remote (or Recallable). 
A reachable distance has the property of having the associating 
devices within reach of the users. Users can use their touch 
sensory system to interact with the devices. For example, a 
method that uses near field communication to associate devices 
[27] limits the interaction to be within a reachable distance. A 
noticeable distance has the attribute that the distance is not 
reachable, yet the associating devices are separated within a 
noticeable distance. For example, pointing a light beam and using 
audible sound are association methods that limit the interaction 
within a noticeable distance. For completeness, ideally, devices 
that are separated beyond a noticeable distance, such as occluded 
by a wall, could still be connected remotely. However, if the 
devices are separated by a remote distance, the device cannot 
associate in a spontaneous manner, as the user is required 
recalling prior knowledge of the remote target devices to identify 
them. 
Furthermore, we should note that the distance category is related 
to the perceptibility category (section 2.2.3). Tangible associa-
tions require the connecting devices to be within a reachable 
distance so that the user can hold the devices. Also, sensible and 
non-interactive association models require devices to be within a 
noticeable distance to be associated. 
3. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK 
Many new models for associating device have emerged, and each 
model was designed to solve a specific problem. Comparison 
between the models is difficult, as insufficient generalisation has 
been discussed in research. To understand differences and simi-
larities between different models, we need classifications where 
we can allocate the models into categories. In this paper, we 
surveyed different association models from literatures and, based 
on those models, we constructed a classification of categories that 
influence the usability of the models. By using the classification, 
it is possible to identify and to build usability analysis of how 
association models differ or are related. 
The focus of our paper is on usability; the work we introduced 
only represents a partial picture of generalising device association. 
Many more categories are yet to be identified. For example, ease 
of learning can influence users’ willingness to adopt an associa-
tion method. As well as, adaptability; some authentication 
methods like text input, gestures entry and biometrics are 
adaptable for both user and device authentication, while some are 
only suitable for one. People’s prior knowledge and experience 
with an authentication model can influence their preferences. 
For future work, we intend to adopt the classification in building a 
comparative usability analysis as well as taxonomies of different 
device association models proposed in literatures. 
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